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We extend the spherical code based key distribution protocols to qudits with dimensions 4 and
16 by constructing equiangular frames and their companions. We provide methods for equiangular
frames in arbitrary dimensions for Alice to use and the companion frames, that has one antipode
to eliminate one of the possibilities, made up of qudits with N = 4, 16 as part of Bob’s code. Non-
orthogonal bases that form positive operator valued measures can be constructed using the tools of
frames (overcomplete bases of a Hilbert space) and here we apply them to key distribution that are
robust due to large size of the bases making it hard for eavesdropping. We demonstrate a method
to construct a companion frame for an equiangular tight frame for Cp−1 generated from the discrete
Fourier transform, where p is any odd prime. The security analysis is based on the assumption
restricting possible attacks to intercept/resend scenario highlighting the advantages of a qudit over
qubit-based protocols.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses the laws of quantum mechanics to allow two users to effectively
and securely generate a one-time pad in order to protect sensitive information from adversaries. The first
such protocol, the so-called BB84 algorithm [1], employs two sets of mutually unbiased orthonormal bases
of C2. In this protocol, the first basis set is the eigenbasis of one observable (for example σx) and the
second basis set is the eigenbasis of one of the two sets of complimentary observables (σy and σz). In [2],
the BB84 protocol is extended to six states, employing both sets of complimentary measurements. The
increase in the observables allows for better adversarial eavesdropper detection [3]. Another way to set up
quantum communication protocols that minimize error probabilities while maximize mutual information
involve non-orthogonal positive-operator valued measures (POVMs) such as the three-state quantum
cryptography protocol introduced by Chefles et al [4]. This class of protocols are interesting due to the
existence of powerful results on POVMs that can be used to design rejected-data protocols that reveals
the presence of eavesdropper using the bits that would be discarded. In [4], [5] and [6] the authors move
to the more general framework of non-orthogonal POVMs for qubit quantum key distribution based on
equiangular spherical codes. The simplicity of spherical codes is due to avoidance of sacrificing potential
key letters in order to determine the amount of information that an attacker has learned about the key
sequence as the success rate provides this information. The protocols further provide a wide range of
security and rate of key generation for a given dimension of the systems. When the number of signal
states is fixed the spherical codes offer higher noise threshold for security than mutually-unbiased bases
with a trade off in terms of lower key generation rates. Specific examples of this family of protocols
include two qubit based spherical codes the trine that bests BB84 and the tetrahedron which performs
better than six-state in terms of improved resistance to eavesdropping and providing the key error rate in
terms of sift rate thus offering a simplified framework. QKD protocols in higher dimensions up to sixteen
[7] and the ones based on qudits [8], [9] that are error-resilient inspired us to look for spherical codes in
similar dimensions as they would combine the advantages of both classes of protocols. In this work we
are concerned with developing more general spherical codes in higher dimensions using the Hilbertian
frames and carry out the security analysis in the context of intercept/resend attacks.
There is a well established correspondence between POVMs and the class of tight frames. Let d ≥ 2. A
tight frame for Cd is a set of vectors {fj}Nj=1 ⊂ Cd such that for all x ∈ Cd we have that
∑N
j=1 |〈x, fj〉|2 =
A ‖x‖2 for some positive constant A. If in addition, ‖fj‖ = 1, for each j = 1, . . . , N , then {fj}Nj=1 is called
a finite unit norm tight frame (FUNTF), and it is easy to see that A = N/d. A FUNTF F = {fj}Nj=1
for which there exists a constant c > 0 with |〈fj , fk〉| = c for, j 6= k is called an equiangular tight frame
(ETF) (also known as mutual unbiasedness). We refer to [10–12] for more on finite frame theory and
some of its applications. Observe that if {fj}Nj=1 is a FUNTF for Cd, then we can write
N∑
j=1
d
N
fj ⊗ f †j = Id×d,
which is to say,
{
Πj =
d
N fj ⊗ f †j
}
forms a POVM. Similarly, one may construct a unit norm tight frame
from any POVM [13].
Renes’ four state protocol [6] employs a four element ETF {fj}4j=1 for C2 with |〈fj, fk〉|2 = 13 , j 6= k.
The corresponding POVM is known as a symmetric, informationally complete, POVM (SIC-POVM). In
general, if N = d2 and {fj}d
2
j=1 forms an equiangular tight frame for C
d, then the corresponding POVM is
a SIC-POVM. The existence of such ensembles in all dimensions is an open problem in harmonic analysis,
and quantum information theory, respectively. Nonetheless, for every dimension d ≥ 2 there exists an
ETF of d + 1 vectors in Cd obtained by taking any d rows of the (d + 1) × (d + 1) DFT matrix and
renormalizing the resulting column vectors. In the sequel, we shall consider the ETF obtained by taking
the last d rows of the (d+1)×(d+1) DFT matrix. We call this ETF the (d+1, d) Fourier ETF, or simply
3the Fourier ETF when the context is clear. More generally, using a difference set sampling strategy, the
class of harmonic equiangular tight frames may be constructed (cf. [14]).
Both the three state and four state quantum key algorithms rely on a measurement ensemble, generated
by a companion equiangular tight frame {gj} defined as follows: given an equiangular tight frame F =
{fj}Nj=1, the equiangular tight frame G = {gj}Nj=1 is a companion equiangular tight frame for F if
|〈gj, fk〉|2 =
{
0 k = j
c otherwise
(1)
Much like the existence of equiangular frames, the construction of such sets is a non-trivial problem. In
this paper we offer constructions of companion equiangular tight frames to the (d + 1, d) Fourier ETF
for a family of values of d. We then extend the equiangular QKD algorithms to these dimensions, and
illustrate our algorithms with some examples.
For completeness, we recall the set up of the equiangular QKD protocol. Assume that Alice and Bob
wish to communicate securely and have access to a quantum channel as well as a classical one. Alice and
Bob predetermine an equiangular frame set of states {fj}Nj=1 from which Alice uniformly samples from the
N states and picks out fk, which she sends to Bob. Bob has a measurement device corresponding to the
POVM
{
Gj =
d
N gj ⊗ g†j
}N
j=1
where {gj}Nj=1 is a companion equiangular frame for {fj}Nj=1. Bob receives
fk from Alice and performs a measurement with outcome l ∈ {1, ..., N}. Now Bob knows with certainty,
Alice did not send fl, as the probability of measuring l given fl is |〈gl, fl〉|2 = 0. However, Bob knows
nothing about which of the other N − 2 possible states that might have been sent. To determine this,
Bob then communicate a random sampling S of N − 2 elements of {1, ..., N} \ {l} without replacement.
He sends the sample S to Alice through a classical channel. If k ∈ S, then Alice signals failure and
sends a new quantum state. If k 6∈ S (which has a probability of 1N−1 of happening) then Alice and Bob
both know that Alice sent state k, while anyone viewing the classical communication only knows that
Alice sent either fk or fl. Alice and Bob generate a random classical bit based on an a priori agreed
upon algorithm (say b = 1 if (−1)l = 1 and b = 0 otherwise). Based on eavesdropping of the classical
channel, an eavesdropper Eve has at best a 2−k probability of guessing the correct k bit number based on
complete knowledge of the classical communications, which would presumably have some sort of classical
encryption. Similarly, an intercept and resend attack on the quantum channel would quickly be detected,
as Alice and Bob’s keys would not match with arbitrarily high probability.
Before the difficulty of experimental implementation, there is the non-trivial task of generating equian-
gular frames, and the associated companion set. In C2, the geometric representation of the Bloch sphere
was used in order to construct such sets [4, 5]. However, this type of geometric construction seems absent
in higher dimensions. Nonetheless we shall construct a family of companion ETFs starting from some
(d+ 1, d) Fourier ETFs.
We demonstrate later that, when d+1 is any odd prime, a (d+1, d) Fourier ETF F = {fj}d+1j=1 for Cd
and a d× d diagonal unitary and traceless matrix U exist such that
G = {gj |gj = Ufj , j = 1, ..., d+ 1}
is a companion equiangular frame for F .
This is easily accomplished in two dimensions using the Bloch sphere representation and doing a
three dimensional rotation within that representation and mapping back to C2. For example, let fj =
1√
2
[1 eiπj/3]∗ for j = 0, 1, 2. Then the transformation
R =
[
1 0
0 eiπ
]
,
which amounts to a 180 degree rotation in the xy plane in the Bloch sphere, accomplishes the desired
4result:
|〈Rfj, fk〉|2 =
{
0 j = k
3
4 j 6= k
. (2)
If F = {fj}Nj=1 is an ETF for Cd and if there exists a companion ETF G = {gj = Ufj}Nj=1 for some
unitary d× d matrix U , then we may proceed in generalizing Renes’ protocol. In particular, the common
inner product of F (hence of G) is α = N−dd(N−1) . The frame operators of F and G are also identical, and
equal N/dId×d. Hence we may define a positive-operator valued measure (POVM) associated with each
frame as Gj =
d
N gjg
∗
j and Fj =
d
N fjf
∗
j .
Suppose Alice prepares a state fk and sends it to Bob. If Bob then measures using the G
′
js then the
probability of measuring outcome j in an experiment is given by
Pr(j|fk) = tr(Gjfkf∗k ) = tr(f∗kGjfk) =
d
N
〈gj, fk〉 〈fk, gj〉 = d
N
|〈gj , fk〉|2 . (3)
Now, using the fact that the f ′ks form an N/d tight frame, that gj has a unit norm, and that the sets
satisfy Equation (1) we have for j 6= k
|〈gj , fk〉|2 = 1
N − 1
∑
k 6=j
|〈gj, fk〉|2 = N
d(N − 1) ‖gj‖
2 =
N
d(N − 1) .
Combining with Equation (3) yields
pr(j|fk) =
{
0 j = k
1
N−1 j 6= k
.
Hence, for a fixed measurement outcome j, there is an equal probability that the state being measured
was fk for k 6= j and no probability that the state was fj .
In some case, there might not exist a unitary matrix U that would produce a companion ETF G =
{Ufj}Nj=1 from an ETF F = {fj}Nj=1 for Cd. Indeed, Renes also has a four element equiangular frame
given by
F =
[
α α β β
iβ −iβ α α
]
where α =
√
1
6 (3 +
√
3) and β =
√
1
6 (3−
√
3). Let
U =
[
a b
c d
]
be unitary. Then solving diag(F ∗UF ) = [0, 0, 0, 0] non-trivially is actually impossible as it requires b = c
which implies a = d = 0 which implies b = −c or similar contradiction. Therefore, no unitary U exists
such that gj = Ufj exists that satisfies (1). However, if we set a = d = 0 and b = c = 1 then gj = Ufj
for j = 1, 2 and g3 = Uf4 and g4 = Uf3 then gj and fj satisfy (1). One can ask whether such a unitary
transformation (up to re-indexing) exists for higher dimensions. If it does, then we can generalize the
two dimensional results from Renes to arbitrary higher finite dimensions. Namely, if such an R works in
dimension d, we would have gj = Rfj in (1) and our measurement operators would be scaled versions of
gjg
∗
j . Therefore, a companion ETF can be constructed if one can find a unitary transformation U and
a permutation matrix P such that G = UFP where F is the matrix synthesis operator of the initial
5frame and G = [g1, g2, ..., gN ] is the synthesis operator for the desired new frame. Hence, (1) may be
reformulated as
|(G∗PFU)i,j |2 = |(P ∗F ∗U∗G)i,j |2 =
{
0 i = j
c o.w.
.
The main goal of this paper is to construct companion ETF from the (d + 1, d) Fourier ETF when
d + 1 is prime. This is achieved by constructing a d× d traceless diagonal matrix of ±1. Let u˜ ∈ Cd be
the vector of ±1 consisting of the diagonal entries of U , and u =
[
0
u˜
]
∈ Cd+1. Then u is an eigenvector
of W , the (d + 1)× (d + 1) DFT matrix. We conjecture that every unitary diagonal traceless matrix U
yielding a companion ETF to the (d + 1, d) Fourier ETF necessarily generates either an eigenvector of
the DFT matrix as described above, or a vector u such that Wu = λu∗ for sume unimodular number λ.
We have not been able to prove this conjecture, but through exhaustive search, we observed that there
indeed exist such vector for all prime number up to 59. Furthermore, our numerical search shows that
no such eigenvector exist for composite numbers in this range.
II. COMPANION ETF IN PRIME DIMENSIONS
As mentioned in the introduction, starting from the ETF {fk}2k=0 ⊂ C2, it is known that the family
{Rfk}2k=0 is a companion ETF where R =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. Note that R is unitary and traceless. One is
naturally lead to ask if, given a FUNTF {fk}Nk=1 ⊂ Cd, can one find a unitary traceless d × d matrix U
such that {fk}Nk=1 and {Ufk}Nk=1 are companion ETFs.
Before we answer this question in some special cases, we note that if {fj}Nj=1 is an equiangular FUNTF
for Cd, the set of N2 d × d matrices defined by {fj ⊗ fk = fjf∗k}Nj,k=1 forms a two distance tight frame
for Cd×d under the Hilbert Schmidt inner product, [15].
Proposition 1. Suppose that {fj}Nj=1 is an equiangular FUNTF for Cd. Then
{fj ⊗ fk}Nj,k=1 = {fjf∗k}Nj,k=1
is a two-distance FUNTF for Cd×d under the Hilbert Schmidt inner product.
Proof. We have from the properties of the tensor product that
〈fm ⊗ fn, fj ⊗ fl〉HS = 〈fmf∗n, fjf∗l 〉HS = 〈fm, fj〉 〈fl, fn〉 .
Since |〈fj , fk〉|2 = α = N−dd(N−1) for all j 6= k, we have that
∣∣〈fm ⊗ fn, fj ⊗ fl〉HS∣∣2 =

1 m = j, l = n
α m = j, l 6= n
α m 6= j, l = n
α2 m 6= j, l 6= n
.
So we have a unit normed two distance (in absolute value) set (distances α and α2) with α occurring
2(N2)(N − 1) times, α occurring N2(N − 1)2 times. To show tightness, let M ∈ Cd×d be arbitrary. We
have ∑
j
∑
k
∣∣〈M, fjf∗k 〉HS∣∣2 =∑
j
∑
k
∣∣tr(f∗jMfk)∣∣2 =∑
k
∑
j
|〈Mfk, fj〉|2 = N
d
∑
k
‖Mfk‖2 . (4)
6We also have for M∗ = [M1, ...,Md] that ‖Mfk‖2 =
∑
ℓ |〈fk,Mℓ〉|2 and therefore
∑
k
‖Mfk‖2 =
∑
ℓ
∑
k
|〈fk,Mℓ〉|2 =
∑
ℓ
N
d
‖Mℓ‖2
=
N
d
∑
l,i
|Ml[i]|2 = N
d
‖M‖2HS .
Plugging into (4) shows that {fk ⊗ fj}j,k∈{1,...,N} is a N2/d2 tight frame for Cd×d.
Proposition 1 can be used as follows. If F = {fj}Nj=1 is an ETF for Cd, then to find a unitary d × d
matrix U such that G = {gj = Ufj}Nj=1 is a companion ETF to F reduces to finding the coefficients
(〈U, fj ⊗ fℓ〉HS)Nj,ℓ=1. However,
〈U, fj ⊗ fℓ〉HS = tr(Ufℓf∗j ) = tr(f∗j Ufℓ) = 〈Ufℓ, fj〉 = 〈gℓ, fj〉 =
√
α e2πiθℓ,j
where α = N−dd(N−1) , and θℓ,j ∈ [0, 1) is an unknown phase factor. Thus, determining U is equivalent to
finding these unknown phases. This is an example of the nontrivial phase retrevial problem, see [16] and
the references therein for more details. From a complexity point of view, U belongs to the d2 dimensional
space Cd×d for which {fj ⊗ fk}Nj,k=1 = {fjf∗k}Nj,k=1 is a two-distance FUNTF of N2 vectors. The right
regime to recover U from only the magnitudes of its frame coefficients is N2 > d4, i.e., N > d2. But as
we shall see, the results we obtain are for N = d + 1. Consequently, our results are not covered by the
phaseless reconstruction theory.
Because of the complexity of the problem, we seek a unitary, diagonal and traceless d× d matrix that
would produce a companion ETF from an ETF F . In particular, we shall only consider the case where
F is the (d+ 1, d) Fourier ETF, and show that finding such diagonal unitary matrix reduces to finding a
specific eigenvector of the DFT matrix.
A. Construction of companion FUNTFs in prime dimensions
Let d ≥ 2 be fixed and set ω = e− 2πid . Suppose that F = {fk}d+1k=1 is a (d + 1, d) Fourier ETF for
Cd generated by taking the columns of the (d + 1)-dimensional DFT matrix, removing the top row and
scaling by 1√
d
. Let v[k] denote the k-th entry in the vector v, starting with 0 (so v[0] is the leading entry).
Assume there exists a traceless, diagonal, unitary d× d matrix U such that |〈Ufk, fj〉| =
{
0 k = j
c o.w.
. We
recall that c =
√
d+1
d , and we have for k 6= j that
|〈Ufk, fj〉| =
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
n=1
(Ufk)[n− 1]fj [n− 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
n=1
Un,nfk[n− 1]fj[n− 1]
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
d
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
n=1
Un,nω
n(k−j)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1d
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
n=1
Un,nω
nℓ
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
d
∣∣∣√d+ 1∣∣∣ , (5)
7where ℓ = k − j 6= 0. Hence, if we denote the diagonal D of U as D =
U1,1...
Ud,d
 and embed D in Cd+1 via
the mapping
D 7→
[
0
D
]
= f,
then (5) implies that for ℓ 6= 0
∣∣∣f̂ [ℓ]∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∣ 1√d+ 1
d∑
n=0
ωnℓf [n]
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1√d+ 1
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
n=1
Un,nω
nℓ
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1, (6)
where f̂ is the (d+ 1) DFT of f . Since U is unitary, we have that |f [j]| = 1 for j 6= 0. Furthermore, the
traceless condition on U implies that fˆ [0] = f [0] = 0. Thus the vector f and its DFT fˆ have unimodular
entries except their first entry which is 0. Because the eigenvalues of the (d + 1 × d + 1) DFT matrix
are ±1,±i, it is clear that the corresponding eigenvectors u have the property that |uˆ[k]| = |u[k]| for
k = 0, . . . , d. Therefore, if we find a function of the form of f that is an eigenfunction of the ((d+1)×(d+1))
DFT, then the lower d unit modulus entries of f define a traceless, diagonal, unitary transformation that
generates a companion equiangular tight frame for {fk}d+1k=1. The following construction of such an
eigenvector is given in [17], when d + 1 = p is a prime odd number. In the sequel we denote the p × p
DFT matrix by W . We refer to [17] for a proof.
Proposition 2. Define f ∈ Cp by
f =
[
0,
(
1
p
)
2
,
(
2
p
)
2
, · · · ,
(
k
p
)
2
, · · · ,
(
p− 1
p
)
2
]∗
where
(
n
p
)
2
is the Legendre symbol, defined by
(
n
p
)
2
=
{
1 if n is a quadratic residue modulo p
−1 if n is not a quadratic residue modulo p
for 1 ≤ n ≤ p− 1. Then f is an eigenvector of W . Furthermore, when p ≡ 1 (mod 4), the eigenvalue for
this vector is 1, and when p ≡ 3 (mod 4), the eigenvalue is −i.
In fact, our main result shows that this is the only eigenvector of the form [0,±1,±1, · · · ,±1] for W .
More specifically,
Theorem 3. If u1, u2 are eigenvectors of W of the form [0, 1,±1, · · · ,±1]∗, then u1 = u2.
The proof of this result is based on the following lemmas, which we first prove. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, the following proofs standardize the vectors by assuming that the first nonzero
entry is +1.
Lemma 4. If u1, u2 are distinct vectors of the form [0, 1,±1, · · · ,±1]∗ such that Wu1 = λ1u1 and
Wu2 = λ2u2, then λ1 6= ±λ2.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that λ1 = λ2. (The λ1 = −λ2 case is shown similarly.)
From the first row of W ,
u1[1] + u1[2] + u1[3] + · · ·+ u1[p− 1] = 0
8and
u2[1] + u2[2] + u2[3] + · · ·+ u2[p− 1] = 0
Define v[k] = (u1[k]− u2[k])/2 for 1 ≤ k ≤ p− 1. Then by subtracting the second equation from the first
and dividing by 2,
v[1] + v[2] + v[3] + · · ·+ v[p− 1] = 0. (7)
From the second row of W ,
u1[1]ω + u1[2]ω
2 + u1[3]ω
3 + · · ·+ u1[p− 1]ωp−1 = u1[1]λ1 = λ1
and
u2[1]ω + u2[2]ω
2 + u2[3]ω
3 + · · ·+ u2[p− 1]ωp−1 = u2[1]λ2 = λ2 = λ1.
By subtracting the second equation from the first and dividing by 2,
v[1]ω + v[2]ω2 + v[3]ω3 + · · ·+ v[p− 1]ωp−1 = 0. (8)
Let A = {k : v[k] = 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ p−1}, B = {k : v[k] = −1, 1 ≤ k ≤ p−1}, and C = {0, 1, 2, · · · , p−1}\B.
By a basic property of roots of unity, ∑
k∈B
ωk +
∑
k∈C
ωk = 0.
(8) can be written as ∑
k∈A
ωk −
∑
k∈B
ωk = 0.
Combining the two equations above, ∑
k∈A
ωk +
∑
k∈C
ωk = 0. (9)
(7) implies that |A| = |B|. Then |A| + |C| = |A| + p− |B| = |A| + p − |A| = p. Note that A and B are
disjoint, so A and C are not. Thus, (9) is a vanishing asymmetric sum of p p-th roots of unity. However,
this is not possible by [18, Theorem 3.3], raising a contradiction. Therefore, λ1 6= λ2.
Lemma 5. If u1, u2 are distinct vectors of the form [0, 1,±1, · · · ,±1]∗ such that Wu1 = λ1u1 and
Wu2 = λ2u2, then λ1 6= ±iλ2.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that λ1 = iλ2. (The λ1 = −iλ2 case is shown similarly.)
From the second row of W ,
u1[1]ω + u1[2]ω
2 + u1[3]ω
3 + · · ·+ u1[p− 1]ωp−1 = u1[1]λ1 = λ1
and
u2[1]ω + u2[2]ω
2 + u2[3]ω
3 + · · ·+ u2[p− 1]ωp−1 = u2[1]λ2 = λ2 = −iλ1.
Let A1 = {k : u1[k] = 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ p − 1}, B1 = {k : u1[k] = −1, 1 ≤ k ≤ p − 1}, and C1 =
{0, 1, 2, · · · , p− 1} \B. Then |A1|+ |C1| = p, and by following the process in Lemma 4,∑
k∈A1
ωk +
∑
k∈C1
ωk = λ1.
9Similarly, by letting A2 = {k : u2[k] = 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ p − 1}, B2 = {k : u2[k] = −1, 1 ≤ k ≤ p − 1}, and
C2 = {0, 1, 2, · · · , p− 1} \B, it follows that |A2|+ |C2| = p and∑
k∈A2
ωk +
∑
k∈C2
ωk = −iλ1.
Let ω0 = e
−πi
2p , so ω0 is a 4p-th root of unity such that ω
4
0 = ω. Then the previous two equations are
equivalent to ∑
k∈A1
ω4k0 +
∑
k∈C1
ω4k0 = λ1 (10)
and ∑
k∈A2
ω4k0 +
∑
k∈C2
ω4k0 = −iλ1,
respectively. Multiplying the second equation by −i = e−πi2 = ωp0 ,∑
k∈A2
ω4k+p0 +
∑
k∈C2
ω4k+p0 = −λ1. (11)
Adding (10) and (11), ∑
k∈A1
ω4k0 +
∑
k∈C1
ω4k0 +
∑
k∈A2
ω4k+p0 +
∑
k∈C2
ω4k+p0 = 0. (12)
This is a sum of 2p 4p-th roots of unity. Since p is an odd prime, it follows from [18, Theorem 3.3] that
such a sum must be one of:
• p symmetric sums of two 4p-th roots of unity, or
• two symmetric sums of p 4p-th roots of unity.
We now show that both of these are impossible.
Choose any k in A1 ∪C1. Since p is odd, k+ p2 cannot be in A1 ∪C1 and k + p4 cannot be in A2 ∪C2,
so ω4k is in the sum but −ω4k = ω4k+2p is not. Thus, the sum cannot consist of p symmetric sums of
two 4p-th roots of unity.
Since |A1|+ |C1| = p and A1 and C1 are not disjoint, the sum in Equation 10 is not a symmetric sum
of p roots of unity. However, every term in this sum is a p-th root of unity, while no term in (11) is a
p-th root of unity. Thus, the sum in (12) cannot consist of two symmetric sums of p 4p-th roots of unity.
The sum in (12) is neither p symmetric sums of two 4p-th roots of unity nor two symmetric sums of p
4p-th roots of unity, which gives the desired contradiction. Therefore, λ1 6= iλ2.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3. Let Wu1 = λ1u1 and Wu2 = λ2u2. Since the only eigenvalues of the DFT
are 1,−1, i, and − i, either λ1 = ±λ2 or λ1 = ±iλ2. If u1 6= u2, then these are both impossible according
to Lemmas 4 and 5. Therefore, u1 = u2.
Using this construction, an equiangular tight frame F = {fj}Nj=1 for CN−1 along with a companion
frame G can be constructed for any prime N = p+ 1. In particular, the companion frame satisfies
G = {gj |gj = Ufj , j = 1, ..., N}
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where U is the (N − 1)× (N − 1) matrix whose diagonal entries are the lower N − 1 entries in f .
By an exhaustive computational search, the existence and uniqueness of the eigenvector in the above
construction was verified for all primes up to 59. Interestingly, the search yielded no eigenvectors of
the form [0,±1,±1, · · · ,±1]∗ for composite N up to this same value, and we conjecture that no such
eigenvector exists for any composite N . While this fact is evident if N is even (one need simply consider
the first row of the DFT), a full proof of this fact is not forthcoming.
Example 6. We provide a few examples of the construction above. We construct an equiangular tight
frame {fj}4j=1 in C4 by sampling the 5× 5 DFT matrix. Indeed, we have
DFT = 1√
5

1 1 1 1 1
1 ω ω2 ω3 ω4
1 ω2 ω4 ω ω3
1 ω3 ω ω4 ω2
1 ω4 ω3 ω2 ω
 ,
and
P =
0 1 0 0 00 0 1 0 00 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
 ,
and we set fj equal to the j
th column of 12P ∗DFT . Define gj = Ufj for j = 1, ..., 5 where
U =
1 0 0 00 −1 0 00 0 −1 0
0 0 0 1
 .
Then we have 〈gj, fj〉 = 1− 1− 1 + 1 = 0 and |〈gk, fl〉|2 = 516 for k 6= l. Hence, {gj}
4
j=1 is a companion
equiangular frame for {fj}4j=1.
Similarly, sampling the 7 × 7 DFT matrix and employing U = diag[1, 1,−1, 1,−1,−1] generates an
equiangular harmonic frame and a companion equiangular frame for C6, where 〈gj , fj〉 = 1+ 1− 1 + 1−
1− 1 = 0 and |〈gk, fl〉|2 = 736 for k 6= l.
Remark 7. When p ≡ 1 mod 4 is prime, [17] provides a second construction which satisfies the criteria
for f . The vector is
f =
[
0,
(
1
p
)
4
,
(
2
p
)
4
, · · · ,
(
k
p
)
4
, · · · ,
(
p− 1
p
)
4
]∗
where
(
n
p
)
4
is defined by
(
n
p
)
4
=

1 if n(p−1)/4 ≡ 1 mod p
i if n(p−1)/4 ≡ c mod p
−1 if n(p−1)/4 ≡ c2 ≡ −1 mod p
−i if n(p−1)/4 ≡ c3 ≡ −c mod p
Here, c is defined as a primitive fourth root of unity in the multiplicative group of integers mod p, i.e. an
integer c such that c2 ≡ −1 mod p.
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While this f is not an eigenvector of the DFT, it still satisfies the property that each entry except
for the first has magnitude 1 and that the magnitude of each entry remains fixed under the DFT. In
particular, there exists a complex constant z of magnitude 1 such that Wf = zf. Thus, as in the previous
construction, this vector f can be used to construct a diagonal matrix U which generates a companion
frame.
As an example of this construction, sampling the 5×5 DFT matrix and employing U = diag[1, i,−i,−1]
generates an equiangular harmonic frame and a companion equiangular frame for C4, where 〈gj , fj〉 =
1 + i− i− 1 = 0 and |〈gk, fl〉|2 = 516 for k 6= l.
In fact, as a generalization of the above constructions, if p is a prime number congruent to 1 mod m,
then define the vector
f =
[
0,
(
1
p
)
m
,
(
2
p
)
m
, · · · ,
(
k
p
)
m
, · · · ,
(
p− 1
p
)
m
]∗
where
(
n
p
)
m
is defined by
(
n
p
)
4
=

1 if n(p−1)/m ≡ 1 mod p
ζ if n(p−1)/m ≡ c mod p
ζ2 if n(p−1)/m ≡ c2 mod p
ζ3 if n(p−1)/m ≡ c3 mod p
...
ζm−1 if n(p−1)/m ≡ cm−1 mod p
Here, ζ is a primitive m-th root of unity in C, and c is defined as a primitive m-th root of unity in the
multiplicative group of integers mod p, i.e. an integer c such that cm ≡ 1 mod p and ck 6≡ 1 mod p for
all positive integers k < m.
While this f is not an eigenvector of the DFT, it still satisfies the property that each entry except for the
first has magnitude 1 and that the magnitude of each entry remains fixed under the DFT. In particular,
there exists a complex constant z of magnitude 1 such that Wf = zf .
As an example of this construction, let w and w∗ be such that w2 = i and (w∗)2 = −i. Sampling the
17 × 17 DFT matrix and employing U = diag[1, i,−w∗,−1, w∗, w,−w,−i,−i,−w,w,w∗,−1,−w∗, i, 1]
generates an equiangular harmonic frame and a companion equiangular frame for C16, where 〈gj , fj〉 = 0
and |〈gk, fl〉|2 = 17256 for k 6= l.
B. Security analysis
Here, we assume that the attacks Eve can carry out against the key distribution are of the type
intercept/resend, that is, she measures a fraction of signals sent by Alice and forwards a different state
to Bob. In the asymptotic limit of sample size of the qubits transmitted the length R of the key string
that can be distilled by Alice and Bob with Eve has zero information is:
R = I(A : B)−min{I(A : E), I(B,E)}. (13)
where the quantity I refers to the mutual information between two parties that quantifies how much
knowledge of one party’s outcome implies the result of the second party. The best strategy for Eve is to
use Alice and Bob’s basis 50% of the time as the expression is symmetric with respect to both of them.
Eve can choose only one of the bases that will increase the length of the key by breaking the symmetry.
She can use a combination of the strategies to restore the symmetry and at the same time maximize
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the mutual information with either of the parties. It is desirable to quantify the mutual informations in
terms of the quantity q the fraction of the signal that Eve intercepts.
Let {fj}Nj=1 be an equiangular FUNTF for Cd, where N > d, of square angle α = |〈fj , fk〉|2 = N−dd(N−1) ,
∀j 6= k. Suppose d = 2n. Then the space Cd can be described by n qubits. In it, the FUNTF as
defined in the Introduction. Let {gj}Nj=1 be a companion equiangular frame for {fj}Nj=1, so |〈gj , fk〉|2 =
N
d(N−1)(1 − δjk).
Alice generates one of the states fj with equal probabilities,
1
N , and sends it to Bob. He, in turn,
performs a measurement obtaining an outcome gk (k 6= j) with probability 1N−1 . He publicly announces
a set of N − 2 numbers l 6= k. If the set does not contain j, then Alice declares success, otherwise the
protocol fails. Evidently, it succeeds with probability
R0 =
1
N − 1 . (14)
When it succeeds, Alice and Bob share the information (j, k) which is an ordered pair. By listening to
Bob’s announcement, Eve knows the set {j, k}, but she does not know the order. Therefore, Alice and
Bob have generated one shared secret classical bit which is the order of j, k in the pair (j, k), say
ǫjk =
{
0 , j > k
1 , j < k
(15)
To gain advantage, Eve intercepts Alice’s signal and performs a measurement. Her outcome agrees with
Alice’s signal with probability dN . The rest of time, she obtains one of the other N − 1 states, each with
probability N−dN(N−1) .
When Eve and Alice agree, the protocol fails with probability N−2N−1 , as in the case of no interference
by Eve. When Eve disagrees with Alice, then either one of the two numbers Bob leaves out of his public
announcement can match Alice’s, so the probability of failure is now
(
N−2
N−1
)2
. Then the probability of
Alice announcing success is
R = 1− N − 2
N − 1
d
N
−
(
N − 2
N − 1
)2(
1− d
N
)
=
2N2 − (d+ 3)N + 2d
N(N − 1)2 (16)
to be compared with the probability of success (14) without Eve’s interference. The error is
ǫR =
R
R0
− 1 = (N − d)(N − 2)
N(N − 1) (17)
which approaches 100% as N becomes large. This is only possible in higher-dimensional spaces (d≫ 1).
When Eve and Alice disagree, Alice can announce success even though she disagrees with Bob’s bit (a
fact she is unaware of). This occurs once every N − 1 times, resulting in an error. Therefore,
QBER =
1
R
(
1− d
N
)
1
N − 1
=
(N − 1)(N − d)
2N2 − (d+ 3)N + 2d (18)
Notice that QBER approaches 50% as N becomes large in higher dimensional spaces.
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